We develop a number of variants of Lifschitz realizability for CZF by building topological models internally in certain realizability models. We use this to show some interesting metamathematical results about constructive set theory with variants of LLPO including consistency with unique Church's thesis, consistency with some Brouwerian principles and variants of the numerical existence property.
Introduction
In [22] and [23] , Van Oosten shows how the Lifschitz realizability topos can be viewed as a category of sheaves over a particular Lawvere-Tierney topology constructed in the effective topos. Although a remarkable result, it has some shortcomings:
1. The construction refers explicitly to computable functions and Lifschitz's encoding of finite sets. This makes it appear that the construction is unique to the effective topos and cannot be carried out in other toposes.
2. The construction relies on many technical definitions and techniques from topos theory.
3. The construction is not guaranteed to work predicatively.
In this paper we will give a new presentation of this result. Instead of topos theory we work in the set theory CZF, which is regarded as a predicative theory for mathematics. Instead of Lawvere-Tierney topologies, we will use formal topologies and a predicative notion of topological model due to Gambino. Aside from this difference in presentation, our results are more general than Van Oosten's in two ways (although the first of these does relate to some more recent results by Lee and Van Oosten in [10] ).
Firstly, instead of considering just one formal topology, we will consider an infinite family of formal topologies L n for each natural number n ≥ 2, with the original Lifschitz realizability model just corresponding to the formal topology L 2 . The topologies L n correspond to certain variants of LLPO, which were first studied by Richman in [19] , and are denoted LLPO n . We will use these models to give a new proof of a theorem due to Hendtlass and Lubarsky in [9] : LLPO n+1 is strictly weaker than LLPO n . This answers positively a question raised by Hendtlass: is there a variant of Lifschitz realizability that separates LLPO n from LLPO n+1 ?
Secondly, we identify axioms, IP Fn,N N that hold in the McCarty realizability model V (K 1 ) that suffice to carry out internally the construction of the formal topologies L n we will use in the models. This can be done entirely in CZF + MP + IP Fn,N N , without any explicit reference to computable functions. This enables us to easily generate variants of Lifschitz realizability by simply checking that the same axioms IP Fn,N N hold in other realizability models. By using realizability with truth in this way we will show that the theories CZF + MP + LLPO n have certain variants of the numerical existence property. By using realizability over K 2 in this way we will show that CZF + LLPO is consistent with certain (but not all) Brouwerian continuity principles.
A more traditional version of Lifschitz realizability for CZF + LLPO + CT ! similar to that in [5] can be recovered by a two step process of interpreting the topological model V (L2) in the McCarty realizability model V (K 1 ), itself constructed in CZF + MP as illustrated below.
Constructive Set Theory
We will consider the intuitionistic set theories CZF and IZF, as described for instance in [1] or [2] . We will use the following set theoretic formulations of Markov's principle and Church's thesis. Definition 2.1. Markov's principle, MP, is the following axiom. Let α : N → 2 be a function. Then, ¬¬ (∃n ∈ N) α(n) = 1 → (∃n ∈ N) α(n) = 1 Definition 2.2. Church's thesis, CT 0 is the following axiom. Let φ(x, y) be any formula. Then, writing {e}(n) to mean the result of running the eth Turing machine with input n, (∀n ∈ N)(∃m ∈ N) φ(n, m) → (∃e ∈ N)(∀n ∈ N) φ(n, {e}(n))
Church's thesis for functions, CT ! is the axiom that every function from N to N is computable.
We recall the following definitions and theorems on finite sets, as appear in [2, Chapters 6 and 8] . The theorems will often be used implicitly while working with finitely enumerable sets. Definition 2.3. A set X is finite if for some n ∈ N there exists a bijection from n to X.
A set X is finitely enumerable if for some n ∈ N there exists a surjection from n to X.
Theorem 2.4 (CZF).
Suppose that φ(x 1 , . . . , x n ) is a formula of arithmetic, where all quantifiers are bounded, and the only free variables are amongst x 1 , . . . , x n . Then we can prove the following instance of excluded middle. Definition 3.3. Let S := S, ≤, ⊳ be a formal topology. A set-presentation for S is a (set) function R : S → P(PS) such that a ⊳ p ↔ (∃u ∈ R(a))u ⊆ p If (S, ≤, ⊳) has a set-presentation, we say it is set-presentable.
Definition 3.4. Let S := S, ≤, ⊳ be a set presentable formal topology. We define the nucleus of S to be the following class function j : P(S) → P(S). For p ⊆ S, j(p) := {a ∈ S | a ⊳ p}
We extend j to an operation, J, on subclasses of S by J(P ) := {j(v) | v ⊆ P } Definition 3.5. We say a formal topology S, ≤, ⊳ is proper if for all a ∈ S, ¬a ⊳ ∅. (Or equivalently if j(∅) = ∅.) Definition 3.6. Let S = S, ≤, ⊳ be a set presentable formal topology. The class V (S) is defined inductively as the smallest class such that f ∈ V (S) whenever f is a function with dom(f ) ⊆ V (S) and for all x ∈ dom(f ), f (x) is a ⊳-closed subset of S.
For each sentence φ in the language of set theory with parameters from V (S) , we assign a ⊳-closed class denoted φ , which we define by induction on formulas as follows. For bounded φ, φ will be a set.
We first define a complete Heyting algebra structure on the class of ⊳-closed classes as follows. For P and Q ⊳-closed classes, ⊤ := S ⊥ := J(∅) P ∧ Q := P ∩ Q P ∨ Q := J(P ∪ Q) P → Q := {a ∈ S | a ∈ P → a ∈ Q} x∈U P x := J x∈U P x x∈U P x := x∈U P x
We define the interpretation of atomic sentences a ∈ b and a = b by simultaneous induction on a and b:
We then extend this to all formulas as below.
We write V (S) |= φ to mean φ = ⊤. For a collection of formulas, Φ, we write
Theorem 3.7 (Gambino) . Let S be a set presentable formal topology. Then
Some Absoluteness Lemmas
For some of the results later, it will be important that under certain conditions statements that hold in the background universe also hold internally in the topological model and vice versa. To this end, we prove a series of absoluteness lemmas below. First note that any set x can be viewed as an element of V (S) ,x as follows.
dom(x) := x x(y) := ⊤ for all y ∈ x Lemma 3.8. In the below, let φ and ψ be any formulas, possibly with parameters from V (S) .
1. We can prove in CZF that for any set x, φ(ŷ) = ⊤ holds for all y in x if and only if (∀y ∈x) φ(y) = ⊤ holds.
φ ⊆ ψ if and only if
3. φ = ⊤ and ψ = ⊤ if and only if φ ∧ ψ = ⊤.
For proper formal topologies
Proof. For 1, 2 and 3 note that joins and implications in the Heyting algebra on ⊳-closed classes are exactly the usual joins and implications for the Heyting algebra of subsets of a set. 1, 2 and 3 follow by the basic properties of Heyting algebras. 4 is just by unfolding definitions. For 5, note that we have
However, we also have
Then 5 easily follows.
One can then prove 6 by a similar argument.
Proof. Suppose that ( x φ(x) ) ⊆ ψ . Then we have
However, ψ is already ⊳-closed, so J( ψ ) = ψ . But then it easily follows that (∃x) φ(x) ⊆ ψ and so ((∃x) φ(x)) → ψ = ⊤. The other part can be proved by a similar argument.
Lemma 3.10. Let x and y be sets and let z ∈ V (S) . Then,
Proof. We first check (1) . Unfolding definitions we have that both z ∈ {x, y} and z =x ∨ z =ŷ are equal to j( z =x ∪ z =ŷ ). It easily follows that (1) holds. We now check (2) . Unfolding definitions we have the following.
By monotonicity of j and union we have z ∈ x ⊆ (∃w ∈x) z ∈ w . We now check z ∈ x ⊇ (∃w ∈x) z ∈ w . By axiom 3 of the definition of formal topology, it suffices to check that v∈x j( w∈v z =ŵ ) ⊆ j( v∈x w∈v z = w ). Let a ∈ v∈x j( w∈v z =ŵ ). Then for some v ∈ x, we have a ∈ j( w∈v z =ŵ ). But now a ∈ j( v ′ ∈x w∈v ′ z =ŵ by monotonicity of j, as required.
Lemma 3.11. The natural numbers are absolute, in the following sense.
Proof. First note that (∀u ∈N) u ∩ {u} ∈N = u∈N û ∪ {û} ∈N but this is equal to ⊤ by lemma 3.10 and the fact that {u} ∪ u ∈ N for every u ∈ N. We also easily have ∅ ∈N . But we have now shown one half of the bi-implication:
Now assume that for some v ∈ N, a ∈ u =v ∪ {v} . Then using the soundness of the laws of equality, we have u =v∪{v} ∩ v∪{v} ∈N ⊆ u ∈N . Hence a ∈ u ∈N . But we now apply both parts of lemma 3.9 to deduce
which is the other half of the bi-implication we require. Proof. These are proved simultaneously by induction on n and m. Lemma 3.13. Finite tuples are absolute, in the following sense. We can show in CZF that for every set x and every n ∈ N and every set z, z ∈ x n ↔ z ∈xn = ⊤ Proof. This can be proved by induction on n.
Lemma 3.14. Let x be a set. Then function application for N x is absolute, in the sense that for f ∈ N x , z ∈ x and n ∈ N, f (z) = n if and only if f (ẑ) =n = ⊤.
Proof. Note that the formulaf (ẑ) =n is equivalent to the following (∀w ∈f )(∀v ∈x)(∀u ∈N) w = v, u → u =n This is clearly absolute by the previous lemmas.
Remark 3.15. In [8] 
LLPO and LLPO n

An Alternative Formulation of LLPO
We will first show how LLPO can be formulated in terms of the poset N ∞ defined below. This formulation will motivate the definition of the formal topology as the simplest one making LLPO true in the topological model (based on an observation of Van Oosten in [22] ).
Definition 4.1. Let N ∞ be the set of decreasing binary sequences, i.e.
We will consider N ∞ as a poset with the pointwise ordering, i.e. α ≤ β if for all i ∈ N, α(i) ≤ β(i). Proof. Suppose F = 1. Then by Markov's principle, there is some n such that F (n) = 0. However, we now clearly have α(n) = 0 for some α ∈ F (since {α(n) | α ∈ F } is a finitely enumerable set of natural numbers), and hence α = 1. Proof. Since F is finitely enumerable, we can write F = {α 1 , . . . , α k }. By Markov's principle we have for each i, n i such that α i (n i ) = 0. Take N := max i n i . Then we have that ( F )(N ) = 0 and therefore F = 1.
Recall that LLPO is usually formulated as below. Definition 4.6. The lesser limited principle of omniscience (LLPO) is the following axiom. Let α : N → 2 be a binary sequence such that for all i, j ∈ N, if α(i) = α(j) = 1 then i = j. Then either for all i ∈ N, α(2i) = 0, or for all i ∈ N α(2i + 1) = 0.
We now obtain the equivalent presentations of LLPO below. Proof. To show 1 ⇒ 2, let α, β ∈ N ∞ be such that α ∨ β = 1. Then define γ : N → 2 as below. Then by applying LLPO to γ, we can show either α = 1 or β = 1. Now to show 2 ⇒ 1, let γ : N → 2 be such that for all i, j if γ(i) = γ(j) = 1, then i = j. Define α and β as follows.
Then one can easily check that α ∨ β = 1, and if α = 1 then γ(2i) = 0 for all i, and if β = 1 then γ(2i + 1) = 0 for all i. Finally note that 2 is a special case of 3, and that 3 follows from 2 by showing by induction on n that the result holds for all F that admit a surjection n ։ F .
Generalising to LLPO n
In [19] , Richman considered for each n ≥ 2 a variant of LLPO, that he denoted LLPO n . These axioms were also studied by Hendtlass and Lubarsky, who showed (amongst other results) that LLPO n+1 is strictly weaker than LLPO n . In this section we show that like LLPO, LLPO n can also be formulated using N ∞ . Definition 4.8. Let n ≥ 2. LLPO n is the following statement: Let α : N → 2 be a binary sequence such that for all i, j ∈ N, α(i) = α(j) = 1 implies i = j. Then there is some k with 0 ≤ k < n such that for all i, α(in + k) = 0. We now give the equivalent formulation using N ∞ . Proof. Similar to the proof of proposition 4.7.
We now aim towards another characterisation of LLPO n analogous to part 3 of proposition 4.7 that will be useful later.
Definition 4.11. For each n, we define the set of n-trees by the following recursive definition.
1. There is an n-tree nil.
2. If we have a list of n-trees T 1 , . . . , T n and a list of decreasing sequences α 1 , . . . , α n ∈ N ∞ , then Tr(T 1 , . . . , T n ; α 1 , . . . , α n ) is an n-tree.
12. An n-tree is defined to be good according to the following recursive definition.
1. nil is good.
Tr(T
Definition 4.13. An n-tree is defined to be very good according to the following inductive definition.
1. nil is very good.
2. Tr(T i ; α i ) is very good if it is good, and for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n, α i = 1 and T i is very good.
Theorem 4.14. LLPO n is equivalent to the statement that every good n-tree is very good.
Proof. We first assume that every good n-tree is very good and deduce LLPO n . Let α 1 , . . . , α n ∈ N ∞ be such that for any 1 ≤ i = j ≤ n, α i ∨ α j = 1. Then note that we can form a good n-tree Tr(nil; α i ). If Tr(nil; α i ) is very good, then for some i, α i = 1, as required. For the converse, we assume LLPO n and prove by induction that for every n-tree, T , if T is good then T is very good.
For nil, this is clear. For T = Tr(T i ; α i ), assume that T is good. Then for 1 ≤ i = j ≤ n we have α i ∨ α j = 1. Hence, for some i, α i = 1 by LLPO n . Since T is good and α i = 1, we have that T i is good. But by induction we may assume now that T i is very good. Hence, T is also very good. Definition 4.15. LLPO ∞ is the following statement. Let (, ) : N × N → N be a surjective pairing function, and let α : N → 2 be a binary sequence such that α(i) = 1 for at most one n. Then for some k ∈ N, and for all n ∈ N α(k, n) = 0. Proposition 4.16. LLPO ∞ is equivalent to the following statement. Let (α i ) i∈N be such that α i ∈ N ∞ for each i ∈ N. Suppose further that for i = j, α i ∨ α j = 1. Then for some i, α i = 1.
Absoluteness Results for n-Trees
We next show how to encode n-trees as functions N → N.
Definition 4.17. Let T be an n-tree. We define the shape of T , S(T ) ∈ N as follows. Assume that we have a standard way of encoding lists of natural numbers as natural numbers such that encoding and decoding can be done in a primitive recursive manner and the code for a list is greater than each of its elements, and write this using brackets ().
S(nil) is defined to be ().
S(Tr(T
We define the data for T , D(T ) ∈ 2 N as follows.
2. We define D(Tr(T i ; α i )) as follows. For any j ∈ N, j can be written uniquely as either 2nk + 2i or 2nk + 2i + 1 where 0 ≤ i < n. We define
Lemma 4.18. There are primitive recursive functions b, c, f , g 0 and g 1 such that an n-tree T is good if and only if
Proof. We define b(S(nil)) to be 0. We can then take c, f, g 0 , g 1 to be anything (e.g. constantly equal to 0). We now deal with the case T = Tr(T i ; α i ). We define
. . , T n ; α 1 , . . . , α n )) we have one of the following two cases (and we can decide which in a primitive recursive manner).
For some (unique
and this is unique when we require furthermore that k is the greatest such value.
For case 1, we take c(l, S(T )) := 0. The value of f now makes no difference, so we take it to be constantly 0. Now write l
For case 2, we define c(l, S(T )) := 1. Let l ′ and k be as in the description of case 2. We split into cases on whether or not c(S(
In either case, we define
(This corresponds to ensuring that if α k (j) = 1 for all j then T k is good.) Proof. Note that if f is a primitive recursive function, then the formula f (n) = m is equivalent to one built from bounded universal quantifiers, conjunctions, ⊥ and implication, and hence is absolute. Note that formula (3) is built from formulas of this form together with function application, bounded universal quantification implication and negation. Hence it is absolute. We showed in lemma 4.18 that the statement that α codes a good tree is equivalent to this formula and so that is also absolute.
Lemma 4.20. There are primitive recursive functions b and f such that for any n-tree T , T is very good if and only if there is l < b(S(T )) such that for all
Proof. For T = nil we define b(S(T )) to be 0, so we can take f (l, S(nil), i) to be anything. For T = Tr(T 1 , . . . , T n ; α 1 , . . . , α n ), we define
Then, note that for l < b(S(T )), l can be written as
where 0 ≤ k < n and 0 ≤ l ′ < b(S(T k )) and this is unique if we require the greatest such k.
Then splitting into cases depending on whether the input to f is odd or even, we define
Corollary 4.21 (CZF + MP).
For any n-tree T , and any list of n-trees T 1 , . . . , T k , we have
If T is good, then the double negation of "T is very good" is true.
Suppose the following statement is false: T i is very good for every
Proof. Note that part 1 follows directly from lemma 4.20. We now show part 2.
Suppose that it is false that T i is very good for every 1 ≤ i ≤ k. We define a finite sequence α 0,1 , . . . , α 0,k ∈ N ∞ using f from lemma 4.20 by,
Note that we cannot have α 0,i = 1 for all i, since then each T i would be very good. Hence by Markov's principle, there is some i 0 such that α 0,i0 = 1. We then define α 1,i by
Then, repeating the same argument as before, we find i 1 such that α 1,i1 = 1. We continue this process until reach n such that i n = b(S(T in ) − 1. At this point, we have found j such that f (l, S(T in ), j) = 1 for every l < b(S(T in )) and hence can apply lemma 4.20 to show that T in is not good.
Some Special Cases of Independence of Premisses
In this section we define a family of variants of independence of premisses (IP). The motivation for this it that it allows us to easily state some special cases of IP that hold in certain realizability models and are needed to construct the formal topologies we will use later.
Definition 5.1. Let Φ(x, y) be a formula with only x and y free variables and Ψ(z) a formula with only z as a free variable. We will think of Ψ as a class, and write z ∈ Ψ to mean Ψ(z). We think of Φ(x, y) as a class of pairs and write x, y ∈ Φ to mean Φ(x, y). Write IP Φ,Ψ for the following axiom schema. For any formula φ, 
Proof. We want to show
So assume that x, y ∈ Φ and ((∀u ∈ y)(∃v ∈ Y ) φ). Note that we can define a formula φ ′ (u, w) equivalent to φ(u, f (w)) and show (∀u ∈ y)(∃w ∈ X) φ ′ This is because for every u ∈ y, we have some v ∈ Y such that φ(v), but we can then take w to be g(v). Then since
Taking v to be f (w), we have
But we have now proved IP Φ,Y , as required.
The Schema IP Fn,N N
We now come to the special cases, IP Fn,N N , of IP Φ,Ψ that we will need to construct the formal topologies later.
Definition 5.3. Let n ∈ N. Define F n to be the class of pairs x, y where x is of the form {α 1 , . . . , α n } where α 1 , . . . , α n ∈ N ∞ such that for any 1 ≤ i = j ≤ n, α i ∨ α j = 1 and y = x ∩ {1}. Then viewing N N as a class, we define IP Fn,N N according to definition 5.1.
It is important to note that IP Fn,N N implies several variants, that will also be used throughout this paper. Where it is clear from context, we will write that we invoke IP Fn,N N when we actually mean one of the variants listed below. Proof. Suppose that x = {α 1 , . . . , α n } where α i ∨ α j = 1 for i = j and such that for all u ∈ x ∩ {1} there exists v ∈ Ψ such that φ(u, v).
By LLPO n , we know that α i = 1 for some i. However, this implies that 1 ∈ u ∩ {1}, so there must exist v ∈ Ψ such that φ (1, v) . Note that we trivially have that u = 1 implies φ(u, v), and so we have now proved this instance of IP Fn,Ψ .
IP
We now check that IP Fn,N N actually holds in the most basic realizability model for set theory, V (K 1 ), developed by McCarty in [13] . The proof uses a key idea that is already implicit in Lifschitz's original presentation of Lifschitz realizability [11] and also appears the newer versions by Van Oosten [21] . Proof. Note firstly that we can show in CZF that for any f ∈ N N , ¬¬f = 1 implies f = 1. Hence, we can replace y by {f ∈ x | ¬¬f = 1}.
We are given a 0 , a 1 ∈ K 1 such that
and need to construct computably b ∈ K 1 such that
Note that for any formula ψ, we have c ¬ψ for some c ∈ K 1 if and only if c ¬ψ for every c ∈ K 1 . Hence, if c ¬¬u = 1 for some c ∈ K 1 , then 0 u = 1. Now let d, u ∈ x. Note that (a 0 d) 0 is a code for a total computable function. We define a new computable function as follows. Given input n, in parallel, run the following two algorithms. Second algorithm: Try to evaluate a 1 d0. If this is successful, then try to evaluate (a 1 d0) 0 n. If this is successful, then halt and return (a 1 d0) 0 n.
Let n ∈ K 1 . Suppose that neither of these algorithms halts. Then in particular, for all m, (a 0 d) 0 m = 1. However, we would then have 0 ¬¬u = 1 and so a 1 d0 must be defined, with (a 1 d0) 0 a total computable function. This implies that the second algorithm halts successfully, giving a contradiction. Hence by MP one of the algorithms must halt, and so we get a total computable function. Note that we did this uniformly in d, so in fact we have b 0 ∈ K 1 such that for each d, u ∈ x, b 0 d denotes and is a total computable function defined as above.
Now define b such that for every
Note first that for any d, u ∈ x, bd ↓, since b 0 d ↓ and for any term t, λz.t denotes (even if t does not). Furthermore, as shown above, (bd) 0 is always a total computable function. In particular, we have (bd) 0 , (bd) 0 ∈ N N , where (bd) 0 is the function in V (K 1 ) represented by (bd) 0 , and N N is the standard implementation of N N in V (K 1 ). Now suppose that for some c ∈ K 1 , c ¬¬u = 1. In particular, this implies that for every m, (a 0
as required. Finally, note that we constructed b uniformly in a, so we do indeed have a realizer for the implication
IP Fn,N N in Realizability with Truth
We now do the same thing for realizability with truth. For this to work we this time need to assume that IP Fn,N N holds already in the background universe (which was not needed for V (K 1 )).
Lemma 5.7 (CZF + MP + IP Fn,N N ). IP Fn,N N holds in the realizability with truth model V * studied in [16] .
Proof. Let V * be the realizability with truth model from [16] . We will construct, for each instance ψ of IP Fn,N N a closed application term t ψ such that t ψ tr ψ.
Recall from the proof of lemma 5.6, that each instance of IP Fn,N N is equivalent to a formula of the following form.
Finding a realizer for this formula amounts to 1. Showing that the implication is true 2. Constructing a such that whenever
ab is defined, and
To show 1, we simply apply IP Fn,N N in the background. For 2, let b be as in (5) . We need to construct a realizer as in (6) . Since the formula is of the form (∀u ∈ x) ψ, we need to show (∀u ∈ x
• )(∃v ∈ N N ) ¬¬u = 1 → φ
• and construct ab such that for any d, u ∈ x,
For the truth part, we once again apply IP Fn,N N in the background. For the realizability part, we follow the same proof as for lemma 5.6 to construct a total computable function f . Finally, we need to construct a realizer for
Since, this is an implication, it once again consists of both a realizability part and a truth part. However, by [16, Lemma 5 .10] we have that if ¬¬u • = 1 is true, then 0 tr ¬¬u = 1. Hence, we can apply the proof used in lemma 5.6 for both parts, and therefore the same realizer constructed there still works for this case. 
IP Fn,N N in Function Realizability Models
We now check that the same axioms, IP Fn,N N , also hold in function realizability models.
Lemma 5.9 (CZF + MP).
There is α ∈ K 2 such that the following holds. Suppose that β ∈ K 2 is such that for all γ ∈ K 2 if γ(n) = 1 for all n ∈ N, then βγ ↓. Then, 1. αβ ↓.
For all
3. If γ(n) = 1 for all n ∈ N, then (βγ ↓ by assumption and) αβγ = βγ.
Proof. We define α so that for each β, αβ is as follows.
Note that there is such an α since this is clearly continuous in β and any continuous function is representable in K 2 . Also, note that by unfolding the definition of application in K 2 and applying MP one can show that α is as required.
Lemma 5.10 (CZF + MP). Let V P be the function realizability model from [15] . Let Φ be the class of pairs x, y with x any subset of N N and y = x ∩ {1} (writing 1 for the function constantly equal to 1). Then IP Φ,N N (and hence also IP Fn,N N for each n) holds in V P .
Proof. One can easily use lemma 5.9 to adapt the proof of lemma 5.6 to work over K 2 .
6 The Topological Models V (L n )
We now define the topological models.
In this section, we will assume a fixed n throughout, and refer to n-trees simply as trees.
Definition of L n
In this section we define the formal topologies that we will use for the topological models and check that they are in fact formal topologies. The basic idea is to use the formulation of LLPO n in terms of trees to produce the simplest formal topology where LLPO n holds in the respective topological model, even when it does not hold in the background universe. This is based on the observation of Van Oosten in [22] that the Lifschitz realizability topos is the largest subtopos of the effective topos where an axiom equivalent to LLPO in the presence of Church's thesis holds.
Definition 6.1. Let T be a tree. Then we define the cover from T , Cover(T ) ⊆ {0}, inductively as follows.
. Let T be a good tree. Then 0 ∈ Cover(T ) if and only if T is very good.
Proof. We show this by induction on trees.
For T = nil, we have both 0 ∈ Cover(T ) and T is very good, so the result is clear. Now suppose that T = Tr(T i ; α i ). If T is very good then for some i, α i = 1 and T i is very good. However, if T i is very good, then 0 ∈ Cover(T i ) by the induction hypothesis, and so, we have 0 ∈ Cover(T ). We have shown that if T is very good then 0 ∈ Cover(T ). Now suppose that 0 ∈ Cover(T ). Then for some i, α i = 1 and 0 ∈ Cover(T i ). The latter implies T i is very good by the induction hypothesis, and so by the former T is very good, as required.
Proposition 6.3 (CZF + MP). Let T be a good tree. Then we have
Proof. Suppose that T is a good tree and that 0 / ∈ Cover(T ). Since 0 / ∈ Cover(T ), we have by lemma 6.2 that T is not very good. Then by corollary 4.21 we have that T is not good, giving us a contradiction. Hence we have ¬¬0 ∈ Cover T as required.
Definition 6.4. Let S, ≤ be the poset with S = {0}. Define the relation ⊳ as follows. 0 ⊳ p precisely if Cover(T ) ⊆ p for some good tree, T . Write L n for the tuple S, ≤, ⊳ (we will show that this is a formal topology). Fix a good tree, T . We will show by induction that for any tree S, there is a tree R such that Cover(R) ⊆ Cover(T ) ∩ Cover(S), and that if S is good then R is also good.
For S = nil, we just take R to be T . Now suppose that S = Tr(S i ; α i ). Then we have for each i, a tree R i such that Cover(R i ) ⊆ Cover(T )∩Cover(S i ) and R i is good if S i is good. Define R to be the tree Tr(R i ; α i ). Suppose that 0 ∈ Cover(R). Then for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n we must have α i = 1 and 0 ∈ Cover(R i ). Since Cover(R i ) ⊆ Cover(T ) ∩ Cover(S i ), we also have 0 ∈ Cover(S i ) and 0 ∈ Cover(T ). But, now recalling that α i = 1, the former implies 0 ∈ Cover(S). Hence, Cover(R) ⊆ Cover(T ) ∩ Cover(S). Now suppose that S is good. Then we have that for any 1 ≤ i = j ≤ n, α i ∨ α j = 1. Also, for any i, if α i = 1, then S i is good. But this then implies that R i is good. Hence R is also good.
We can now easily deduce axiom 4.
Proof. We have already shown in lemma 6.5 that axioms 1, 2 and 4 hold. It remains to show that axiom 3 holds. That is, whenever 0 ⊳ p and p ⊳ q, we have 0 ⊳ q. Fix q ⊆ {0}. We show the following by induction on trees. Let T be a tree. Suppose that T is good and whenever 0 ∈ Cover(T ) we have 0 ⊳ q. Then there is a good tree S such that Cover(S) ⊆ q.
First assume T = nil. Then 0 ∈ Cover(T ), and so we have 0 ⊳ q. Let S be any good tree such that Cover(S) ⊆ q. Now assume that T = Tr(T i ; α i ). Assume that T is good and whenever 0 ∈ Cover(T ) we have 0 ⊳ q. Since T is good, we have that for any 1 ≤ i = j ≤ n, α i ∨ α j = 1. Let 1 ≤ i ≤ n be such that α i = 1. Then T i is good, and Cover(T i ) ⊆ Cover(T ). The latter implies that whenever 0 ∈ Cover(T i ) we have 0 ⊳ q and so we may apply the induction hypothesis, to show there exists S such that Cover(S) ⊆ q.
However, we can now apply IP Fn,N N to find for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, a tree S i such that if α i = 1 then S i is good and Cover(S i ) ⊆ q. Define S to be Tr(S i ; α i ). Then whenever i is such that α i = 1, we have that S i is good, and so S must be good. Suppose that 0 ∈ Cover(S). Then for some i we have α i = 1 and 0 ∈ Cover(S i ). Hence also 0 ∈ q. But we have now shown Cover(S) ⊆ q as required.
Some Basic Properties of L n and V (Ln)
Lemma 6.7 (CZF + MP). If LLPO n is true, then we have
is isomorphic to the class of all sets, V .
V (Ln) |= φ if and only if φ is true.
Proof. By LLPO n , we know that every good n-tree is very good. Hence, in this case L n reduces to the trivial formal topology, where for every p ⊆ {0}, 0 ⊳ p if and only if 0 ∈ p. The result clearly follows. Proof. We show by induction on trees, that for every tree T , if T is good and Cover(T ) ⊆ j∈N p j then there exists a finite set J ⊆ N and another good tree S such that Cover(S) ⊆ j∈J p j . For T = nil, we have 0 ∈ j∈N p j and so for some j ∈ N, 0 ∈ p j . Hence we can just take J := {j} and S = nil. Now suppose T = Tr(T i ; α i ). Note that if 1 ≤ i ≤ n is such that α i = 1, then T i is good and Cover(T i ) ⊆ Cover(T ) ⊆ j∈N p j . So by the induction hypothesis, there is a finite set J and a good tree S such that Cover(S) ⊆ j∈J p j . Hence we can apply IP Fn,N N to find for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, a finite set J i ⊆ N and a tree S i such that if α i = 1 then S i is good and Cover(S i ) ⊆ j∈Ji p j . We then take J := n i=1 J i and S := Tr(S i ; α i ) and note these are as required.
Lemma 6.9 (CZF + MP
Then there is some finite
Proof. Apply lemma 6.8 with p j := φ(ĵ) for j ∈ N.
The following lemma will be key to showing later that certain choice axioms and existence properties hold. It appears to be related to the constructions developed by Lee and Van Oosten in [10, Sections 4 and 5]. We will return to this point in section 8.1. Proof. We show by induction on trees that for every n-tree, T , if T is good and Cover(T ) ⊆ j p j , then there exists j ∈ N and an ⌈ n k ⌉-tree S such that Cover(S) ⊆ p j .
For T = nil, we have 0 ∈ j∈N p j . Hence for some j ∈ N we in fact have 0 ∈ p j . We can then take S to be nil. Now suppose that T = Tr(T i ; α i ).
Suppose that α i = 1. Then T i is good and Cover(T i ) ⊆ i p i . So there exist j ∈ N and S a good ⌈ n k ⌉-tree such that Cover(S) ⊆ p j . Hence we can apply IP Fn,N N to find for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, j i ∈ N and an ⌈ n k ⌉-tree S i such that if α i = 1 then S i is good and Cover(S i ) ⊆ p ji . Now suppose that |{j i | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}| > k. Let I ⊆ {1, . . . , n} be such that |I| = |{j i | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}| = |{j i | i ∈ I}| (which exists by finite choice and decidability of equality for N). By assumption, i∈I p i = ∅. Suppose that for all i ∈ I, α i = 1. Then we would have that each S i is good but i∈I Cover(S i ) = ∅, giving a contradiction by corollary 4.21 and lemma 6.2. Hence by lemma 4.4, for some i, α i = 1. Let i ′ ∈ I \ {i}. Since α i = 1, we vacuously have α i = 1 implies that Cover(S i ) ⊆ p j i ′ . Hence we may "replace" j i with j i ′ .
By repeating the above argument we may assume without loss of generality that in fact
Write J for the set {j i | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}. Now note that we have
To show this, see that we can find p, q ∈ N with 0 ≤ q < k such that n = pk + q by Euclid's algorithm. We can then split into cases depending on whether or not q = 0, by decidability of equality for N.
Hence, if we had |{i | j i = j}| < ⌈ n k ⌉ for all j ∈ J, this would imply j∈J |{i | j i = j}| < n k .k = n, giving a contradiction. Hence, for some j ∈ J we must have |{i | j i = j}| ≥ ⌈ n k ⌉. Choose such a j, and I ⊆ {i | j i = j} with |I| = ⌈ n k ⌉ and an enumeration of I. Then let S be the ⌈ n k ⌉-tree Tr((α i ) i∈I ; (S i ) i∈I ). Since T is good and S i is good when α i = 1, S must also be good. Now suppose 0 ∈ Cover(S). This implies that for some i ∈ I, α i = 1 and 0 ∈ S i . But then also 0 ∈ p j . So Cover(S) ⊆ p j as required.
Remark 6.11. Note that in the above lemma we do not have 0 ⊳ p j relative to L n , because we require a good n-tree S, such that Cover(S) ⊆ p j , but have only a good ⌈ n k ⌉-tree. We do however have ¬¬0 ∈ p j . Lemma 6.12 (CZF + MP + IP Fn,N N ). Suppose that for each j ∈ N, p j is a subset of {0} such that 0 ⊳ j∈N p j and that for all j = j ′ ∈ N we have p j ∩ p j ′ = ∅. Then for some (necessarily unique) j ∈ N we have 0 ∈ p j .
Proof. This is a special case of lemma 6.10 with k = 1.
Lemma 6.13 (CZF + MP
Proof. We define g : N → N as follows. Let n ∈ N. For each m ∈ N, set p m := f (n) =m . Note that for m = m ′ , we have p m ∩ p m ′ = ∅, so we can apply lemma 6.12 to find m such that 0 ∈ f (n) =m . We take g(n) to be this m.
Note that by construction we have V (Ln) |= (∀n ∈ N)ĝ(n) = f (m), and so
Then for some G :
Proof. First note that by lemma 6.13 we can show that N N is absolute, in the sense that in V (Ln) we can show thatN N is the set of functions N → N. However, we can now apply the same proof as in lemma 6.13 to get the result. 
Then by lemma 6.13 there is g : N → 2 such that V (Ln) |=ĝ = f . Note that ¬¬(∃x ∈ N)ĝ(x) = 1 is equivalent to ¬(∀x ∈ N)ĝ(x) = 0 and so is absolute. Hence we can apply MP in the background to find m ∈ N such that g(m) = 1. But then V (Ln) |= (∃x ∈ N) f (x) = 1. Therefore MP holds in V (Ln) .
LLPO
The motivation for the definition of L n was to try to write down the simplest topology where LLPO n holds in the topological model. We now check that in fact it really is the case that LLPO n holds in V (Ln) . Note that we don't need to assume LLPO n holds in the background for this to work, although we did need IP Fn,N N , even just to construct the topological model. 
, f is a function N → 2 such that f (i) = 1 for at most one i. Then by lemma 6.13 there must be some (unique) g : N → 2 such that V (Ln) |=ĝ = f . Then by lemma 3.8 we must have that also g(i) = 1 for at most one i. We now define a tree by setting
and then define T := Tr(nil, . . . , nil; α 1 , . . . , α n )
We clearly have that T is a good tree and by lemma 3.8 we know
But we now have that V (Ln) |= LLPO n as required.
Bounded Existential Formulas and Countable Choice in V (Ln)
Although countable choice fails in each V (Ln) , there are weaker variants that we define below that do hold. To formulate them, we first define some notation for certain bounded existential formulas. Definition 6.17. Let φ be a formula. We write (∃ ≤n x) φ as shorthand for the following formula.
Informally, this says that there exists a witness of φ(x) in N, but given any X ⊆ N with |X| = n + 1 it is false that every element of X is a witness of φ(x). In other words φ(x) has at least one, but at most n witnesses. Definition 6.18. We define the following variants of the axiom of choice. Let X be any set.
1. Write AC X,k for the following principle. Let φ(x, y) be a bounded formula (that may have parameters). Suppose that we have (∀x ∈ X)(∃ ≤k y) φ(x, y). Then there is a function f : X → N such that for every x ∈ X, φ(x, f (x)).
2. Write AC m X,k for the following principle. Let φ(x, y) be a bounded formula (that may have parameters). Suppose that we have (∀x ∈ X)(∃ ≤k y) φ(x, y). Then there is a function f : X → N such that for every x ∈ X, there is a good m-tree, T such that if T is very good then φ(x, f (x)).
3. Write AC ¬¬ X,k for the following principle. Let φ(x, y) be a bounded formula. Suppose that we have (∀x ∈ X)(∃ ≤k y) φ(x, y). Then there is a function f : X → N such that for all x ∈ X, ¬¬φ(x, f (x)). 
Proof. Let x ∈ N and suppose that 0 ∈ (∃ ≤k y) φ(x, y) . Then we have by unfolding the interpretation of formulas in V (Ln) and the definition of ∃ ≤k that,
and for every list i 1 , . . . , i k+1
Hence, applying lemma 6.10 with p i := φ(x,î) , we have that for every x ∈ N there exists y ∈ N and a good ⌈ n k ⌉-tree S such that if S is very good then 0 ∈ φ(x,ŷ) . Now applying AC N,N we get a choice function f : N → N. That is, for every x ∈ N, there exists a good ⌈ n k ⌉-tree S such that if S is very good then 0 ∈ φ(x,f (x)) . For each x ∈ N, let g ∈ N N be a code for the tree S as above.
Then the statement that g codes a good tree is absolute by theorem 4.19, so also holds internally. Also, the statement that g codes a very good tree is equivalent to a formula of the form (∃x ∈ N) ψ(x), where ψ is negative by lemma 4.20. Hence by lemma 3.9 the statement "ĝ codes a very good tree implies φ(x,f (x))" must also hold internally.
Finally, we define another variant of choice that will also hold in our model. This will be denoted Herbrand choice, since it also holds in the Herbrand topos developed by Van den Berg in [20] . Definition 6.21. We refer to the following principle as HAC X,N or Herbrand countable choice. Let φ(x, y) be a bounded formula (that may have parameters). Suppose that we have (∀x ∈ X)(∃y ∈ N)φ(x, y). Then there exists a function f from X to the set of finite subsets of N, P fin(N) , such that for all x ∈ X there exists m ∈ f (x) such that φ(x, m).
One can easily show HAC X,N can be alternatively formulated as follows.
Proposition 6.22 (CZF). HAC X,N is true if and only if the following holds.
Suppose that we have (∀x ∈ X)(∃y ∈ N)φ(x, y). Then there exists a function f : X → N such that for all x ∈ X there exists m < f (x) such that φ(x, m). 
Proof. Suppose that V (Ln) |= (∀x ∈ N)(∃y ∈ N)φ(x, y). Then for every n ∈ N, we have V (Ln) |= (∃y ∈ N) φ(n, y). By lemma 6.9 there exists a finite set J ⊆ N such that V (Ln) |= (∃y ∈Ĵ) φ(n, y). Hence also there exists N ∈ N such that V (Ln) |= (∃y <N ) φ(n, y). By AC N,N , we deduce that there is a function f : N → N such that for all n ∈ N, V (Ln) |= (∃y < f (n)) φ(n, y). Finally by absoluteness, we deduce V (Ln) |= (∀x ∈ N)(∃y <f (x)) φ(x, y), and thereby V (Ln) |= HAC N,N .
Applications
Consistency of Church's Thesis with LLPO n
A hallmark of Lifschitz realizability, from Lifschitz's original model for arithmetic in [11] onwards is that it satisfies both Church's thesis and LLPO. We will recover the result from [5] that Church's thesis and LLPO are compatible over IZF. Moreover, we will show something even stronger. Certain variants of the axiom of countable choice are compatible with Church's thesis and LLPO, and as n increases, we can show that successively stronger forms of countable choice are compatible with Church's thesis and LLPO n .
Lemma 7.1 (CZF + MP + CT ! ).
Proof. By lemma 6.13 it suffices to show that for every f ∈ N N , the statement that f is computable holds in V (Ln) . For any f , we have by applying CT ! in the background that there exists e ∈ N such that f = {e}. For every i ∈ N, the statement that f (i) = {e}(i) is of the form (∃x ∈ N) φ(x) where φ is primitive recursive. Since this holds in the background universe we must also have for
Theorem 7.2. Assume that CZF is consistent. Then for each n ∈ N, the following theory is consistent.
Assume that IZF is consistent. Then for each n ∈ N, the following theory is consistent.
Proof. Let T be either CZF or IZF and assume that T is consistent. It is already known that in both cases MP does not change the consistency strength.
(IZF is the same consistency strength as ZF by the main result in [6] and CZF is the same consistency strength as CZF + LPO by [18] ) So we have that T + MP is consistent. Then so is the theory T + MP + CT 0 + IP Fn,N N by working in the McCarty realizability model V (K 1 ) and using the main results in [13] and [17] together with lemma 5.6.
However we now get the result by building the model V (Ln) in T + MP + CT 0 + IP Fn,N N and applying lemmas 6. 15, 6.16, 6.20, 6 .23 and 7.1.
In [19] , Richman gave a proof in Bishop style constructive mathematics that for each n, LLPO n is inconsistent with the statement that all functions are computable (that in fact this is even true for LLPO ∞ ). Richman's argument does not hold in CZF or even IZF, as is already clear from the earlier Lifschitz realizability model in [5] . However, it turns out that the only obstacle is an implicit use of countable choice, and one can use AC ¬¬ N,n to carry out Richman's argument, as follows. Theorem 7.3. For each n ∈ N, the following theory is inconsistent.
Proof. For each i, j ∈ N with j < n, we define α i,j ∈ N ∞ as follows. α i,j (k) is equal to 0 if the ith Turing machine with input i has halted by stage k with output j, and α i,j (k) is equal to 1 otherwise.
Note that for any i and for any j, j ′ < n with j = j ′ we have α i,j ∨ α i,j ′ = 1 (since the ith Turing machine on input i can have at most 1 output). Hence we can apply LLPO n to show that for some j < n, α i,j = 1. Now we can apply AC ¬¬ N,n to find a function f : N → n such that for each i, ¬¬α i,f (i) = 1. (In fact this implies that α i,f (i) = 1, but we don't need this.)
Now apply CT ! to find e ∈ N such that for all i, {e}(i) = f (i). In particular, the eth Turing machine with input e halts with output f (e). Hence, for sufficiently large k we have α e,f (e) (k) = 0 and so α e,f (e) = 1. However, f (e) was chosen so that ¬¬α e,f (e) = 1. Therefore we get a contradiction, as required.
Hendtlass and Lubarsky showed in [9] that LLPO n+1 is independent of LLPO n over IZF + DC using topological models. We obtain here a similar separation result. In addition we get the following corollary by the same argument. is not by theorem 7.3.
Existence Properties
Theorem 7.6. Let T be one of CZF or IZF. Let φ(x) be a formula with one free variable, x. Suppose that
Then there is a finite set J ⊆ N such that
Proof. Suppose that
Then we have by lemma 6.16 that
Fix a primitive recursive encoding of finite sets of naturals as naturals. Then by lemma 6.9, working in T + MP + IP Fn,N N we can prove that there exists a natural number encoding a finite set J such that V (Ln) |= (∃j ∈Ĵ) φ(j). Now applying theorem 5.8 and absoluteness for primitive recursive formulas we have a finite set J ⊆ N such that
By lemma 5.5 we have in particular that,
Finally we apply lemma 6.7 to get
Theorem 7.7. Let T be one of CZF or IZF. Let n, k ∈ N and k < n, and let φ(x) be a formula with one free variable, x. Suppose that
Then for some j ∈ N we have
T
Proof. Suppose that T +MP+LLPO n ⊢ (∃ ≤k x) φ(x). Then we have by lemma 6.16 that
Hence, applying lemma 6.10 with p j := φ(ĵ) , and writing Good(T ) to mean T is a good ⌈ n k ⌉ tree and VeryGood(T ) to mean T is a very good tree,
We now apply lemma 5.8 to find j ∈ N such that
However, we also have by lemma 6.7 that
Finally, we deduce (7) by corollary 4.21 and deduce (8) by theorem 4.14.
Corollary 7.8. Let T be one of CZF or IZF. Let n, k ∈ N and k < n, and let φ 1 , . . . , φ k be sentences. Suppose that
Then for some 1 ≤ i ≤ k we have
Corollary 7.9. Let T be one of CZF or IZF. Let n ∈ N and let φ(x) be a formula with one free variable, x. Suppose that
Proof. This is a special case of (8) in theorem 7.7 taking k := 1.
By contrast, we see below that none of these theories can have the full numerical existence property. Proof. Let T be a consistent recursively axiomatisable extension of CZF + LLPO ∞ . In fact, a similar proof works for any theory T that interprets enough first order arithmetic to state LLPO ∞ and carry out the constructions used in Gödel's incompleteness theorem. However, for convenience we will use definitions and notation from set theory.
Assume that we are given a bijective pairing on N with primitive recursive pairing and projection functions, which we write as (, ), () 0 and () 1 respectively, and let Pr be a primitive recursive provability predicate.
Construct by diagonalisation a formula φ(n), where n is the only free variable and such that
Write ψ(n, m) for the formula
Now define for each n ∈ N, α n ∈ N ∞ as follows
So that we can apply LLPO ∞ , we first show that for all n = n ′ we have α n ∨ α n ′ = 1. For any l ∈ N, assume for a contradiction that α n ∨ α n ′ (l) = 0. Without loss of generality we may assume l is the least such number (since ψ(n, m) is primitive recursive and so decidable). By the minimality of l we must have either ¬ψ(n, l) or ¬ψ(n ′ , l). However, we cannot have both of these since this would imply (l) 0 = n and (l) 0 = n ′ . Hence we have without loss of generality (l) 0 = n and since α n ′ (l) = 0 and ψ(n ′ , l), there must be some l ′ < l such that ¬ψ(n ′ , l ′ ). In particular we have Pr((l ′ ) 1 , φ((l ′ ) 0 ) ) but also for all m < l, ¬ Pr((m) 1 , φ((m) 0 ) ), giving us a contradiction. Therefore, α n ∨α n ′ = 1 as required.
We can now apply LLPO ∞ to show that T ⊢ (∃n ∈ N) α n = 1. Note that this implies T ⊢ (∃n ∈ N) φ(n).
Now if we assume that the numerical existence property holds for T then there must be some n ∈ N such that T ⊢ φ(n). So there must be m such that (m) 1 codes a proof for φ((m) 0 ) (by taking (m) 0 = n). Since the provability predicate is decidable, without loss of generality we can take m to be the least number such that (m) 1 codes a proof for φ((m) 0 ). By the minimality of m we have that for all m
But this is a ∆ 0 sentence, so by absoluteness for ∆ 0 sentences we have
Again by absoluteness of ∆ 0 sentences, we also have
Hence we have T ⊢ ¬φ((m) 0 ), contradicting that T ⊢ φ((m) 0 ) and the consistency of T . Therefore the numerical existence property must fail for T .
Corollary 7.11. For every n, there is a formula with one free variable, φ(x),
Proof. Let φ(x) be the formula from the proof of theorem 7.10. If IZF + LLPO n + MP ⊢ (∃!x ∈ N) φ(x) ∧ ψ(x) was provable, then by corollary 7.9 there would be some j such that IZF + LLPO n + MP ⊢ φ(j) ∧ ψ(j). But in particular this gives IZF + LLPO n + MP ⊢ φ(j) contradicting theorem 7.10.
In [7] , Friedman showed that for every recursively axiomatisable extension of Heyting arithmetic the disjunction property implies the numerical existence property. He further remarks, without proof, that there is a ∆ 0 2 extension that satisfies the disjunction property but not the numerical existence property. As a corollary of the above results, we obtain a reasonably natural example of a Π 0 2 theory with the disjunction property but not the numerical existence property. Proof. Note that the statement (∃n ∈ N) LLPO n can be formalised in set theory and holds in each IZF + MP + LLPO n for each n. However, for each n, we have seen that IZF + MP + LLPO n+1 does not prove LLPO n , so it is not provable in T . Hence T proves (∃n ∈ N) LLPO n but does not prove LLPO n for any n, so the numerical existence property fails.
Consistency of Brouwerian Continuity Principles
Recall that the fan theorem and bar induction are defined as below.
Definition 7.14. Write 2 * for the set of finite binary sequences. If α : N → 2 is an infinite binary sequence, writeᾱ(n) for the finite binary sequence of length n obtained by restricting α.
A subset R of 2 * is a bar if for every α : N → 2, there exists some n ∈ N such thatᾱ(n) ∈ R.
A bar, R, is uniform if there exists n ∈ N such that for all α : N → 2, there exists m ≤ n such thatᾱ(m) ∈ R.
The fan theorem, Fan is the axiom that every bar is uniform. A subset R of N * is a bar if for every α : N → N, there exists some n ∈ N such thatᾱ(n) ∈ R.
A bar, R, is monotone if whenever s ∈ R and s ′ is a finite binary sequence extending s, then also s ′ ∈ R. If s and t are finite binary sequences, write s * t for the concatenation of s and t.
Monotone bar induction, BI M , is the following axiom. Let Q ⊂ N * be such that there is a monotone bar R with R ⊆ Q and Q has the property that whenever s * n ∈ Q for all n also s ∈ Q. Then ∈ Q. Proposition 7.15 (CZF + MP). Let V P be the function realizability model from [15] . Then MP holds in V P .
Proof. This can easily be checked by applying MP in the background and noting that there is a continuous functional that takes as input α : N → 2 such that there exists n with α(n) = 1 and returns the first n such that α(n) = 1. Proof. Let R ∈ V (Ln) be such that the statement that R is a bar holds in V (Ln) . We first construct a set R ′ in the background universe and check that R ′ is a bar. Let R ′ be the set of σ ∈ 2 * such that V (Ln) |= (∃σ ′ ∈ R) σ ′ ≤σ. To show that R ′ is a bar, let α ∈ 2 N . Then V (Ln) |= (∃j ∈ N)ᾱ(j) ∈ R, since R is internally a bar in V (Ln) . Hence by lemma 6.9, there is a finite set J ⊆ N such that V (Ln) |= (∃j ∈ J)ᾱ(j) ∈ R. Then set N := max J. We clearly haveᾱ(N ) ∈ R ′ , and so R ′ is a bar. We can now apply Fan in the background universe to find m such that for every α ∈ 2 N there exists l ≤ m such thatᾱ(l) ∈ R ′ . But we now have V (Ln) |= (∃x ≤m)ᾱ(x) ∈ R as required. Proof. We build V (Ln) in the theory (14) , which is consistent by theorem 7.21. We then have that V (Ln) models (16) By LLPO n , there is 1 ≤ i ≤ n for each α ∈ N N such that (F (α)) i = 1. Let α be such that (F (α)) i = 1 for all i. By LCP there is some i, k ∈ N such that wheneverβ(k) =ᾱ(k), (F (β)) i = 1. However, we can now easily find β such thatβ(k) =ᾱ(k) but (F (β)) i = 1 to get a contradiction. Similarly, we can use AC N N ,2 to get a function G : N N → N such that for all α, (F (α)) G(α) = 1, contradicting Cont(N N , N).
Connections to Other Formal Systems
Connections to Topos Theory
The L n considered in this paper appear to be strongly related to the local operators in the effective topos previously considered by Lee and Van Oosten in [10] , specifically to the local operators corresponding to finitary sights. We expect that in fact these local operators can be obtained by carrying out the construction of L n in the effective topos. The realizability model V P corresponds to the topos RT(K 2 ) (as described, for example, in [23, Section 4.3] ). Since we only require computable functions, one might expect our constructions to work also in the relative realizability topos RT(K REC 2 , K 2 ) (see [23, Section 4.5] ). The realizability with truth model is related to the topos (Eff ↓ ∆) obtained by gluing along the inclusion functor from Set to Eff. Putting this all together, we make the following conjecture.
Conjecture 8.1. Some of the local operators in Eff considered in [10] have counterparts in the toposes RT(K 2 ), RT(K REC 2 , K 2 ) and (Eff ↓ ∆).
(We again point out that Van Oosten has already shown that the original Lifschitz realizability model has a counterpart in RT(K 2 ) (see [23, Section 4.3] ) and for q-realizability (an ancestor of realizability with truth) (see [21, Proposition 3.5])).
Connections to Type Theory
Definition 8.2. Let Γ be a context in type theory. We say that Γ has propositional canonicity for N if whenever Γ ⊢ t : N, there is some n ∈ N and a term p such that Γ ⊢ p : Id N (t, n).
Suppose we are working in a variant of type theory that has a propositional truncation operator (such as type theory with brackets, as in [4] ). In such theories there are two different ways of formalising LLPO depending on whether or not we use the propositional truncation operator − . We call these LLPO + and LLPO ∨ and define them as follows. However, we expect by analogy with the results in this paper that the following holds.
